


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# DYING TO WIN

## THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

Robert A. Pape

"Invaluable ... gives Americans  
an urgently needed basis for  
devising a strategy to defeat  
Osama bin Laden and  
other Islamist militants."

—MICHAEL SCHEUER,  
author of *Imperial Hubris*

INCLUDES A NEW AFTERWORD

**DYING TO WIN**

# **DYING TO WIN**

**THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM**

**Robert A. Pape**



**RANDOM HOUSE TRADE PAPERBACKS**

**NEW YORK**

2006 Random House Trade Paperback Edition

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Published in the United States by Random House Trade Paperbacks,  
an imprint of The Random House Publishing Group,  
a division of Random House, Inc., New York.

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Originally published in hardcover in the United States by Random House,  
an imprint of The Random House Publishing Group,  
a division of Random House, Inc., in 2005.

ISBN 0-8129-7338-0

Printed in the United States of America

[www.atrandom.com](http://www.atrandom.com)

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Book design by Jo Anne Metsch

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for popular support from their community. What this explanation has going for it is that it appears to correlate with some facts from the Palestinian case.<sup>21</sup> Starting in 1994, two separate radical groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, began to conduct suicide terrorist attacks that were rarely coordinated with each other and, starting in 2000, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine launched suicide terrorist attacks as well.

However, there are good reasons to doubt that domestic political competition among rival groups is an adequate explanation either for the Palestinian case in particular or suicide terrorism in general. Even if domestic competition accounts for why multiple Palestinian groups are engaged in suicide terrorism and even if these groups are striving to outbid each other for popular support from the local community, this does not explain why suicide terrorism is so popular among the Palestinian population in the first place.<sup>22</sup> More important, there are many societies in which multiple violent groups compete for domestic political support without their competition leading to suicide terrorism—for instance, Somalia, Colombia, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Nicaragua—while the vast majority of cases of suicide terrorism are not associated with competition among multiple extremist organizations. The Tamil Tigers and al-Qaeda had no competitors during the periods they carried out suicide attacks, while the multiple groups that made up Hezbollah in Lebanon worked together rather than in competition with each other.

## THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

What causes suicide terrorism? To answer this question, we must recognize that modern suicide terrorism occurs mainly in campaigns of suicide attacks carried out by organized groups for specific political goals and extending over a considerable period of time. So the core phenomenon to be explained is not an individual suicide attack, or even many such attacks considered one at a time, but the existence of protracted suicide terrorist campaigns. Although the motives of individual attackers matter, the crucial need is an explanation of the political, social, and individual conditions that jointly account for why suicide terrorist campaigns persist, why so many are occurring now, and why they occur where and when they do.

To explain suicide terrorism, it is helpful to think of a suicide terrorist

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campaign as the product of a three-step process, to explain each step individually, and to provide a unifying framework for the causal logic as a whole. The three principal questions are these.

*First, what is the strategic logic of suicide terrorism?* That is, why does suicide attack make political sense from the perspective of a terrorist organization? If terrorist organizations did not believe that suicide attack would advance their political goals, they would not do it.

*Second, what is the social logic of suicide terrorism?* Why does suicide attack receive mass support in some societies and not others? Without social support from the terrorists' national community, suicide terrorist campaigns could not be sustained.


*Third, what is the individual logic of suicide terrorism?* What makes particular people willing to give up their lives to carry out terrorist attacks? Without a ready supply of willing attackers, suicide terrorist campaigns would be much more limited in scope than they are.

Suicide terrorism depends for its existence on all three of these components—the strategic, the social, and the individual.<sup>23</sup> The diagram on the following page illustrates the general framework for the causal logic of suicide terrorism and supplies a brief summary of the principal mechanisms at work in each level of analysis.

The strategic logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated or random acts by individual fanatics, but rather occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal. Moreover, the main goals of suicide terrorist groups are profoundly of this world. Suicide terrorist campaigns are primarily nationalistic, not religious, nor are they particularly Islamic. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas on the West Bank to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, every group mounting a suicide campaign over the past two decades has had as a major objective—or as its central objective—coercing a foreign state that has military forces in what the terrorists see as their homeland to take those forces out. Further, all of the target states have been democracies, which terrorists see as more vulnerable to coercion than other types of regimes. Even al-Qaeda fits this pattern. Osama bin Laden's highest-priority objective—although he has others—is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf region. Terrorists loyal to al-Qaeda routinely attack American troops, individuals from Western countries, and governments friendly to the West in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.



## CAUSAL LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM



\*Altruistic suicides are those committed to further a goal that the individual's community supports; they are to be distinguished from egoistic suicides, which are committed to escape a life that has become intolerable. See Chapter 9.

There is a disturbing reason why suicide terrorism has been rising so rapidly: over the past two decades, suicide terrorists have learned that this strategy pays. Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish government to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the late 1990s. In all but the case of Turkey, the terrorists' political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before.

Second, suicide terrorism follows a social logic strikingly different from what many assume. Suicide terrorist groups are neither primarily criminal gangs dedicated to enriching their top leaders, nor religious cults isolated from the rest of their society. Rather, suicide terrorist organizations often command broad social support within the national communities from which they recruit, because they are seen as pursuing legitimate nationalist goals, especially liberation from foreign occupation.

Although suicide terrorism is virtually always a response to foreign occupation, only some occupations lead to this result. Suicide terrorism is most likely when the occupying power's religion differs from the religion of the occupied, for three reasons. A conflict across a religious divide increases fears that the enemy will seek to transform the occupied society; makes demonization, and therefore killing, of enemy civilians easier; and makes it easier to use one's own religion to relabel suicides that would otherwise be taboo as martyrdom instead.

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Finally, what motivates individual suicide terrorists? Are suicide attackers driven by economic helplessness, social anomie, religious indoctrination, or something else? Not all suicides arise from similar causes. Emile Durkheim's famous study of suicide in nineteenth-century Europe showed that there are multiple forms of suicide. The most common is "egoistic suicide," in which personal psychological trauma leads an individual to kill himself in order to escape a painful existence. Less common is "altruistic suicide," in which high levels of social integration and respect for community values can lead normal individuals to commit suicide out of a sense of duty. Many, perhaps most, suicide terrorists fit the paradigm of altruistic suicide, at least from the point of view of those who support terrorism to further their political cause. From everyone else's point of view, suicide attacks are murders.

Few suicide attackers are social misfits, criminally insane, or professional losers. Most fit a nearly opposite profile: typically they are psychologically normal, have better than average economic prospects for their communities, and are deeply integrated into social networks and emotionally attached to their national communities. They see themselves as sacrificing their lives for the nation's good.

The bottom line, then, is that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation. Isolated incidents in other circumstances do occur. Religion plays a role. However, modern suicide terrorism is best understood as an extreme strategy for national liberation against democracies with troops that pose an imminent threat to control the territory the terrorists view as their homeland.

Understanding the strategic, social, and individual logics of suicide terrorism has important implications for America's war on terrorism. Our current policy debate is misguided. Neither offensive military force nor concessions alone are likely to work for long. The key problem we face is that our security depends on achieving not one goal, but two: we must defeat the current pool of terrorists seeking to launch spectacular attacks against the United States and our allies, while simultaneously undermining the conditions that will otherwise produce the next, potentially larger generation of terrorists. Accomplishing this overall purpose will require a new strategy for victory; that strategy must recognize that a trade-off exists between our two objectives, because the use of heavy offensive force to defeat today's terrorists is the most likely stimulus to the rise of more.

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wonder if each airplane, building, or bus they see could be a danger to them or their families. When people themselves are weapons of war, it is hard to be confident of safety. However, the future need not be grim. Understanding the logic of suicide terrorism can help us pursue the right domestic and foreign policies to contain this deadly threat.





## Explaining Suicide Terrorism

MY STUDY ASSESSES the record of suicide terrorism and the state and global responses to it over the past twenty years, with a view to explaining how and why suicide terrorism has occurred and persisted, why the incidence is rising, how far the menace is likely to spread, and what can be done to contain it. Although no approach can predict the future with absolute certitude, a comprehensive analysis of the history and causes of suicide terrorism affords us the opportunity to ground our policies in a real knowledge.

My general propositions hold across a wide variety of circumstances and account for a large portion of suicide terrorism, but they have limits. My arguments are meant to account for modern suicide terrorism, especially the increasing use of suicide attack by terrorist groups from the early 1980s to the present. Modern suicide terrorist groups share a number of features. In general, they are weaker than their opponents; their political goals, if not their tactics, are broadly supported by a distinct national community; the militants have a close bond of loyalty to comrades and devotion to leaders; and they have a system of initiation and rituals signifying an individual's level of commitment to the community. Modern suicide terrorist groups may receive material assistance from states that share some of their political aspirations, but they are independent actors who rarely follow the dictates of others blindly. Perhaps most important, modern suicide

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terrorism is highly lethal, because the attackers' purpose is not only to die, but to use their deaths to kill the maximum number of people from the opposing community.

These commonalities make it possible to develop a general theory of modern suicide terrorism. However, the account I offer for the origins of *suicide* terrorism should not be viewed as a general explanation for terrorism as a whole. "Ordinary," nonsuicide terrorism is significantly different. It occurs under a wider variety of circumstances, for a wider variety of goals, with wider variation in the use of destructive force and in sympathy from the terrorists' national community. In addition, nonsuicide terrorism is often used by groups far smaller than those using suicide terrorism. Accordingly, we should not expect the same factors to account equally well for suicide and nonsuicide terrorism. I have set aside the broader problem of terrorism in general in order to concentrate on the specific causes of the deadlier threat, suicide terrorism.

#### WHAT IS SUICIDE TERRORISM?

Terrorism involves the use of violence by an organization other than a national government to intimidate or frighten a target audience.<sup>1</sup> In general, terrorism has two broad purposes: to gain supporters and to coerce opponents.<sup>2</sup> Most terrorist campaigns seek both outcomes to some extent, often aiming to change the target state's policies while simultaneously mobilizing support and recruits for the terrorists' cause. Sometimes terrorism directed at outsiders can also be a way of competing with rival groups for support within the same social movement. However, there are trade-offs between these objectives, and terrorists can strike various balances between them. These choices represent different forms of terrorism, the most important of which are "demonstrative," "destructive," and "suicide" terrorism.

"Demonstrative terrorism" is as much political theater as violence. It is directed mainly at gaining publicity, for any or all of three reasons: to recruit more activists; to gain attention to grievances from soft-liners on the other side; and to gain attention from third parties who might exert pressure on the other side. Groups that emphasize ordinary, demonstrative terrorism include the Orange Volunteers (Northern Ireland), National Liberation Army (Colombia), and Red Brigades (Italy).<sup>3</sup> Hostage taking, airline hijacking, and explosions announced in advance are generally in-

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tended to bring issues to the attention of the target audience. In these cases, terrorists often avoid doing serious harm, so as not to undermine sympathy for the political cause. Brian Jenkins captures the essence of demonstrative terrorism: "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."<sup>4</sup>

"Destructive terrorism" is more aggressive, seeking to coerce opponents with the threat of injury or death as well as to mobilize support for the cause. Destructive terrorists seek to inflict real harm on members of the target audience at the risk of losing sympathy for their cause. Exactly how groups strike the balance between harm and sympathy depends on the nature of the political goal. For instance, the Baader-Meinhof group selectively assassinated rich German industrialists, acts that alienated certain segments of German society but not others. Palestinian terrorists in the 1970s often sought to kill as many Israelis as possible, fully alienating Jewish society but still evoking sympathy from Muslim communities. Other groups that emphasize destructive terrorism include the Irish Republican Army, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the nineteenth-century Anarchists.<sup>5</sup>

"Suicide terrorism" is the most aggressive form of terrorism, pursuing coercion even at the expense of angering not only the target community but neutral audiences as well. What distinguishes a suicide terrorist is that the attacker does not expect to survive the mission and often employs a method of attack (such as a car bomb, suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building) that requires his or her death in order to succeed. In essence, suicide terrorists kill others at the same time that they kill themselves.<sup>6</sup>

The classic model of "suicide attack" that we most commonly think of today includes only situations in which the attacker kills himself or, increasingly among the Tamil Tigers and Palestinians, herself. A broader definition could include any operation that is designed in such a way that the terrorist does not expect to survive it, even if he or she is actually killed by police or other defenders. We might call such operations suicide missions instead of suicide attacks. An example would be the February 1994 Hebron Massacre: its perpetrator, Baruch Goldstein, had no plan for escape, left a note indicating he did not expect to return, and simply continued killing Palestinians until some of his victims brought him down. Such suicide missions have occurred in a number of conflicts, as in the cases of Palestinians who invade Israeli settlements on the West Bank with guns

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and grenades, intending to kill the inhabitants; few of these assailants escape alive.

This book counts only suicide attacks that meet the classic definition, partly because it is the common understanding of the concept, and partly because suicide missions are hard to identify reliably since we rarely know for certain that an attacker who did not kill himself or herself actually expected to die. In any event, including those suicide missions of which we can be confident would not change my basic findings.

In principle, suicide terrorism could be used for demonstrative purposes or could be limited to targeted assassinations. In practice, however, recent suicide terrorists often seek simply to kill as many people as they can. Although this maximizes the coercive leverage that can be gained from terrorism, it does so at heavier cost than other forms of terrorism. Maximizing the number of enemy killed alienates virtually everyone in the target audience, including those who might otherwise have been sympathetic to the terrorists' cause. In addition, the act of suicide creates a debate and often loss of support among moderate segments of the terrorists' community, although it may also attract support among radical elements. Thus, while coercion can be one of the aims of any form of terrorism, coercion is the paramount objective of suicide terrorism.

## THE HISTORY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

The forms of suicide terrorism that concern us most today—a driver detonating a car laden with explosives near a large, inhabited building, or a person exploding a suicide vest in a busy marketplace—were practically unknown before 1980. Instances of suicide terrorism did occur earlier, although these were mainly suicide missions rather than suicide attacks, and were much less common than they are now.

The three best known of these earlier suicide campaigns were those of the ancient Jewish Zealots, the eleventh- and twelfth-century Assassins, and the Japanese kamikazes during World War II.<sup>7</sup>

The world's first suicide terrorists were probably two militant Jewish revolutionary groups, the Zealots and the Sicarii.<sup>8</sup> Determined to liberate Judaea from Roman occupation, these groups used violence to provoke a popular uprising—which historians credit with precipitating the "Jewish War" of A.D. 66—committing numerous public assassinations and other



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<i>Date</i>	<i>Weapon</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Killed</i>
4. Apr. 26, 2003	car bomb	Radio Kashmir, Srinagar	2
5. Dec. 25, 2003	2 car bombs	Musharraf, Islamabad, Pak.	14

<i>Date</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>Weapon</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Killed</i>
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## Campaign #17: Hamas/Islamic Jihad vs. Israel

1. Oct. 26, 2000	Islamic Jihad	bike bomb	Gaza	0
2. Dec. 22, 2000	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	Jordan Valley	3
3. Jan. 1, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Netanya, Israel	10
4. Mar. 4, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Netanya, Israel	3
5. Mar. 27, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	1
6. Mar. 28, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Kfar Saba, Israel	2
7. Apr. 22, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Kfar Saba, Israel	3
8. Apr. 29, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	West Bank	0
9. May 18, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Netanya, Israel	5
10. May 25, 2001	Hamas	truck bomb	Netzarim, Gaza	0
11. May 25, 2001	Islamic Jihad	car bomb	bus, Hadrea	0
12. May 29, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Khamyunis	0
13. June 1, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	nightclub, Tel Aviv	22
14. June 22, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Gaza	2
15. July 9, 2001	Hamas	car bomb	Gaza	1
16. July 16, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Jerusalem	2
17. Aug. 9, 2001	al-Aqsa	car bomb	Jerusalem	0
18. Aug. 9, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Haifa, Israel	15
19. Aug. 12, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Haifa, Israel	0
20. Sept. 4, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	0
21. Sept. 9, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Nahariya, Israel	3
22. Oct. 7, 2001	Islamic Jihad	car bomb	North Israel	2
23. Oct. 18, 2001	PFLP	car bomb	Nahaloz, Gaza	0
24. Nov. 26, 2001	Hamas	car bomb	Gaza	0
25. Nov. 29, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Gaza	3
26. Dec. 1, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Haifa, Israel	11
27. Dec. 2, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	15
28. Dec. 5, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Jerusalem	0
29. Dec. 9, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Haifa, Israel	0
30. Dec. 12, 2001	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	Gaza	0

<i>Date</i>
31. Jan. 25, 2
32. Jan. 27, 2
33. Jan. 30, 2
34. Feb. 16, 2
35. Feb. 18, 2
36. Feb. 27, 2
37. Mar. 2, 20
38. Mar. 5, 20
39. Mar. 7, 20
40. Mar. 9, 20
41. Mar. 20, 1
42. Mar. 21, 1
43. Mar. 27, 1
44. Mar. 29, 1
45. Mar. 30, 1
46. Mar. 31, 1
47. Mar. 31, 1
48. Apr. 1, 20
49. Apr. 10, 2
50. Apr. 12, 2
51. Apr. 19, 2
52. May 7, 20
53. May 19, 2
54. May 20, 2
55. May 22, 2
56. May 27, 2
57. June 5, 20
58. June 11, 2
59. June 18, 2
60. June 19, 2
61. July 17, 2
62. July 30, 2

## Appendix I | 273

	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>Weapon</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Killed</i>
	2	31. Jan. 25, 2002	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	crowd, Tel Aviv	1
	14	32. Jan. 27, 2002	al-Aqsa	bag bomb	street, Jerusalem	1
		33. Jan. 30, 2002	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Tulkara, West Bank	0
	<i>Killed</i>	34. Feb. 16, 2002	PFLP	belt bomb	mall, settlement near Nablus	2
		35. Feb. 18, 2002	al-Aqsa	car bomb	Jerusalem	1
	0	36. Feb. 27, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	IDF checkpoint	2
	3	37. Mar. 2, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	street, Jerusalem	9
el	10	38. Mar. 5, 2002	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	bus, Afula	1
el	3	39. Mar. 7, 2002	PFLP	belt bomb	Ariel, West Bank	0
	1	40. Mar. 9, 2002	Hamas, al-Aqsa	belt bomb	café, Jerusalem	11
ael	2	41. Mar. 20, 2002	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	bus, Umm Al Fahm, Israel	7
ael	3	42. Mar. 21, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	street, Jerusalem	3
	0	43. Mar. 27, 2002	Hamas	belt bomb	hotel, Netanya	28
el	5	44. Mar. 29, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	supermarket, Jerusalem	2
iza	0	45. Mar. 30, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	café, Tel Aviv	1
	0	46. Mar. 31, 2002	Hamas	belt bomb	restaurant, Haifa	16
el Aviv	22	47. Mar. 31, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	Efrat, West Bank	0
	2	48. Apr. 1, 2002	al-Aqsa	car bomb	Jerusalem	1
	1	49. Apr. 10, 2002	Hamas	belt bomb	bus, Haifa	7
	2	50. Apr. 12, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	market, Jerusalem	6
	0	51. Apr. 19, 2002	Islamic Jihad	car bomb	Kissufin, Gaza	0
15		52. May 7, 2002	Hamas	suitcase bomb	snooker hall, Tel Aviv	16
	0	53. May 19, 2002	PFLP	belt bomb	market, Netanya, Israel	3
ael	3	54. May 20, 2002	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Afula	0
	2	55. May 22, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	chess café, Tel Aviv	2
za	0	56. May 27, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	market, Tel Aviv	2
	0	57. June 5, 2002	Islamic Jihad	car bomb	bus, Megiddo, Israel	17
	3	58. June 11, 2001	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	restaurant, Herzilya	1
11		59. June 18, 2002	Hamas	belt bomb	bus, Jerusalem	19
15		60. June 19, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	bus stop, Jerusalem	7
	0	61. July 17, 2002	al-Aqsa	2 bag bombs	theater, Tel Aviv	5
	0	62. July 30, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	café, Jerusalem	0
	0					



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<i>Date</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>Weapon</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Date</i>
63. Aug. 4, 2002	Hamas	belt bomb	bus, Safed, Israel	9	
64. Sept. 18, 2002	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	bus stop, Umm al-Fahm, Israel	1	Can 1. Mar. 22, 2
65. Sept. 19, 2002	Hamas	belt bomb	bus, Tel Aviv	6	2. Mar. 29, 2
66. Oct. 10, 2002	Hamas	belt bomb	bus stop, Tel Aviv	1	3. Apr. 3, 200
67. Oct. 21, 2002	Islamic Jihad	car bomb	Pardes Hanna, Israel	14	4. Apr. 10, 20
68. Oct. 27, 2002	Hamas	belt bomb	gas station, Ariel	3	5. Aug. 7, 20
69. Nov. 4, 2002	Islamic Jihad/ al-Aqsa	belt bomb	mall, Tel Aviv	2	6. Aug. 19, 2 7. Aug. 29, 2
70. Nov. 21, 2002	Hamas	bag bomb	bus, Jerusalem	11	8. Sept. 2, 20
71. Jan. 5, 2003	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	market, Tel Aviv	23	9. Sept. 9, 20
72. Mar. 5, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	bus, Haifa	17	10. Sept. 22, 2
73. Mar. 30, 2003	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	mall, Netanya	0	11. Oct. 9, 20
74. Apr. 24, 2003	al-Aqsa/PFLP	belt bomb	train station, Kfar Saba	1	12. Oct. 12, 2 13. Oct. 14, 2
75. Apr. 30, 2003	Hamas/al-Aqsa	belt bomb	café, Tel Aviv	3	14. Oct. 24, 2
76. May 17, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	Hebron	2	15. Oct. 27, 2
77. May 18, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	bus, Jerusalem	7	16. Oct. 28, 2
78. May 18, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	Wall, Jerusalem	0	17. Nov. 12, 2
79. May 19, 2003	Hamas	bike bomb	IDF, Gaza	0	18. Dec. 10, 2
80. May 19, 2003	Islamic Jihad	bag bomb	mall, Afula	3	19. Dec. 14, 2
81. June 11, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	bus, Jerusalem	17	20. Dec. 16, 2
82. June 19, 2003	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	store, Sdeh Trumot	1	21. Jan. 9, 200
83. July 8, 2003	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Moshav Kfar Yavetz	1	22. Jan. 14, 20
84. Aug. 12, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	bus stop, Tel Aviv	1	23. Jan. 18, 20
85. Aug. 12, 2003	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	store, Rosh Haayin	1	
86. Aug. 19, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	bus, Jerusalem	20	24. Jan. 28, 20
87. Sept. 9, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	café, Jerusalem	7	25. Jan. 31, 20
88. Sept. 9, 2003	Hamas	belt bomb	bus stop, Tel Aviv	9	26. Feb. 1, 20
89. Oct. 4, 2003	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	restaurant, Haifa	21	27. Feb. 11, 2
90. Oct. 9, 2003	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	IDF office, Tulkarm	0	28. Feb. 18, 2
91. Nov. 3, 2003	al-Aqsa	belt bomb	IDF soldiers, Azun, West Bank	0	29. Feb. 23, 2 30. Mar. 2, 20
92. Dec. 25, 2003	PFLP	belt bomb	bus stop, Gehha Junction	4	31. Mar. 18, 2 32. Apr. 21, 20 33. Apr. 24, 20